If a priest has sexual relations with a congregant, can the congregant assert some claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the priest?
Last year the Court of Appeals in Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 11 NY3d 15 [2008], stated that in order for the congregant to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary duty:
And that such a fiduciary relationship must exhibit the characteristics of:
Last week the Court of Appeal was faced with another breach of fiduciary claim by a congregant in Doe v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 2009 NY Slip Op 02264. In this most recent case, the plaintiff was a congregant of a Catholic Church, where the defendant Father Peter DeBellis was a priest. The plaintiff alleged that in November 2000, she began counseling with Father DeBellis. She then alleged that soon after counseling started, they began a sexual relationship that lasted for more than three years. Both the counseling and the sexual relationship allegedly continued despite repeated complaints to the Diocese by plaintiff's husband, and DeBellis's subsequent transfer to another church. Both the plaintiff and her husband commenced an action asserting a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Father DeBellis, and claims for negligent supervision and retention against the Diocese.
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims finding their allegations insufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court stated:
The bare allegation that [plaintiff] was "a vulnerable congregant" is insufficient to establish that plaintiff was particularly susceptible to Father DeBellis's influence. Nor does the complaint provide any other allegations to show that the parties had a relationship characterized by control and dominance.
Since the breach of fiduciary claim against the priest failed, the Court also dismissed the claims for negligent supervision and retention asserted against the Diocese.
Commentary:
I find it very refreshing when courts limit the scope of liability, particularly where consensual behavior is involved. We all may be vulnerable at some point or another. But mere vulnerability does not negate our free will. Free will should be the standard when evaluating the viability of claims such as the plaintiff's. And it appears that the Court of Appeals' recent decisions in this area are along these lines.


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